The Global Calcuttan Magazine Terrorism as State Policy Intractable for Pak
<Editors>
As Shashi Tharoor and others head multi-party delegations to foreign countries to bring the scourge of anti-India terrorism sponsored and facilitated – at times directly waged by its adversarial neighbour, Pakistan, to the fore, the question remains about whether it will have any impact in changing Pakistan’s rogue behaviour.
Since 1947, arming and directing cross-border infiltration first into Jammu Kashmir and later other Indian states is an intractable facet of its foreign policy vis-à-vis India, given the undemocratic and exploitative make-up of the country’s political economy. Projecting India as an enemy and directing terrorists to act against that purported enemy distracts from its growing internationally conceded status as failed state.
The roots of cross-border terrorism initiated by Pakistan goes back to 1947 when, in October, Pathan tribesmen (ethnic Pashtuns) were armed and sent into neighbouring Kashmir to take control of the state, which was in a period of transition post-British Raj. Indeed, as described by historical literature on the subject, including the bestselling book, Freedom at Midnight by Dominque Lapierre and Larry Collins, the Pathans were not only armed and directed by Pakistan but their soldiers were also dressed traditional Pashtun garb and sent into Jammu & Kashmir in order to forcibly acquire the state, which it claimed due to its majority Muslim population.
So, the first cross-border incursion occurred just two months after India and Pakistan became independent nation having been conferred dominion status by the British on the stroke of midnight on August 15th, 1947 (though Pakistan’s then leader, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, established 14th to be its Independence Day, not wanting to celebrate its freedom from Briskish rule on the same day as India).
Jammu & Kashmir had the status of “princely state” under British rule, during which time, the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh ceded defence and foreign relations to the British and collecting taxes on their behalf – but essentially remaining autonomous in its domestic policy. When the independence of the Indian subcontinent was agreed upon by the British, the Indian National Congress Party and the Muslim League as well as less influential stakeholders, the formula for dealing with the princely states was to permit the ruler to join either India or Pakistan.
By October, 1947, the accession of the princely states was largely settled with the ruler signing a writ of accession to either India or Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh was delaying, perhaps thinking he might be able to negotiate an arrangement in which he would remain ruler of the state. However, when Pakistan launched its thinly veiled attack on the state, the Maharaja, fleeing to his winter capital of Jammu, appealed to India for military support.
A meeting was convened between India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s last Viceroy and first Governor General, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and Secretary to the Government of India (the new nation’s most senior bureaucrat) VP Menon who was deeply involved along with Patel in the process of the accession of the Princely States to India. By the end of the meeting, all present concluded that it would be illegal for India’s military to enter territory that was not its own. Faced with the loss of his state to Pakistani aggression, Maharaja Hari Singh to sign the writ of accession to India. With Jammu & Kashmir, thereby, legally acceded to India, the government authorized its armed forces to repel the Pathan tribal and Pakistani military invaders. The Indian defence was effective and efficient, and the army was poised to take back all of the territory taken by the invading force, which Lapierre and Collins note would have reached the capital, Srinagar, had they not stopped to barbarically terrorize the local population, looting the towns, and raping the women, including a nunnery. (Such terrorism including systematic weaponization rape by the Pakistan army is referenced later in this piece.)
With Indian boots on over half of the lost territory, instead of finishing the job and achieving the military objective, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru over the strong objections of his Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel, decided to call a unilateral ceasefire and refer the matter to the United Nations – to ‘save lives.’
Nehru fancied himself a great statesman, and was not only India’s Prime Minister but had taken the Foreign Ministry under his aegis as well – a very unusual move – but one typical of a man who would not countenance any dissent to his view of India’s place in the world. The combination of arrogance and naivety, which came to define his foreign policy was on full display. In his mind, the ‘rules of the game’ so far as the Princely States were concerned had been established by Britain and the Indian independence stakeholders. Maharaja Hari Singh by legally acceding to India had followed the ‘rules of the game’ – ergo the rest of the world should force Pakistan to abide by this decision.
As any student of history would observe: international relations doesn’t work that way. The Word’s pre-eminent power at the time was the USA. The Americans were extraordinarily ignorant about the Indian subcontinent and didn’t much care to know more about this impoverished and backward part of the world. They decided to take advice from the British.
Known for their duplicity, the British decided to go against the ‘rules of the game’ to which they were one of the main parties and explained that as Pakistan was created as a Muslim homeland and Jammu & Kashmir was majority Muslim, that the Pakistanis had a legitimate claim to the territory. The UN responded by passing a resolution (No. 39) that Pakistan and India should withdraw its troops from Jammu & Kashmir, creating conditions for an independent plebiscite to take place. As neither country moved their militaries one inch, the conditions to implement UN Resolution No. 39 could not be fulfilled.
Later, in 1972, India and Pakistan came to terms on the dispute agreeing that the land would be split among the two countries and that each would respect each other’s presence on either side of what had been termed of the Line of Control (LOC), a de facto border between the two nations.
The issue would likely never have persisted had Nehru not internationalized the matter, and permitted the military to achieve the objective that it was propelling towards – a victory that would have been a virtual certainty by expelling Pakistani forces from the entire state of Jammu & Kashmir.
Nehru later proved himself inept in dealings with China bringing war to India’s borders in which India suffered defeat and humiliation at the hands of a nation, which he called India’s “brother,” pushing China closer to Pakistan. Henceforth, instead of having a friendly nation on India’s Eastern flank, India has had to contend with being sandwiched between two hostile countries, albeit one – Pakistan did not pose much of a threat; India could have forged a better relationship with China in which case, Pakistan would not have been so bold in its anti-India policies.
RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
Although Jammu and Kashmir’s past was Hindu – indeed, its very name is derived from the Hindu Sage Kashyap. During ancient times, the Kashmir valley was a lake, and legend has it that Kashyap’s penance impressed the Gods to such a degree that it drained the lake, creating a lush and scenic valley: paradise on Earth. It was thereafter known as Kashmir because of its legendary genesis from the austerities of the Hindu sage Kashyap.
Later, another Hindu saint, Shankaracharya who lived in the 8th century comes to prominence in Kasmiri history, for he had traveled the nearly the entire expanse of the subcontinent on foot to go from his birthplace (now in the Southern State of Kerala, India) all the way to Kashmir in order to gain access to the teachings of the Brahmasutra, a religious text that was kept there. A temple in Srinagar is attributed to his visit, and this is even recognized by one of the most prominent Muslim leaders in the history of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah. The first elected premier of the state in Independent India, Abdullah wrote in the Madras weekly publication, Swatantra, “a memorial to the great Shankaracharya in Kashmir stands prominent on the top of the Shankaracharya Hill in Srinagar” – which was dedicated to him during his visit – and where the Hindu God, Shiva is mainly worshiped. It was the debate that he had with a Kashmiri Pandit woman, in which the great saint had and accepted to have been bested, that is part of the lore around the dedication of the temple.
After the Mughal invasions of India and establishment of their rule, many of the Hindus resident in the area converted either voluntarily, out of influence, or by outright threat of violence, to Islam. This led to the religious composition of the state becoming predominantly Muslim. Estimates accepted by most historians put the proportion at around 77% Muslim, 20% Hindu, with the remaining minority being composed of Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, and Jains. According to the latest the census, around two-thirds of the state is Muslim with 30% being Hindus despite a significant exodus of Hindus due to anti-Hindu terrorism, with the remainder subscribing to the faiths of Sikhism, Buddhism, Christianity and Jainism.
That said, the Muslim community of Jammu & Kashmir – a diverse and liberal society – bore stark contrasts to the predominantly Sunni Muslims dominating Pakistan. Around one third of the Kashmir Muslim community was Shia. This does not include the followers of Sufiism, which had a syncretic relationship with Hindu Shaivites in philosophy. The rule of Persians in Kashmir had a positive impact on the literacy rate, culture, and plurality in the state.
Nund Rishi, Sheikh Noor-ud-din Wali, the founder of the Rishi Order in Kashmir, is generally seen as the reflection of the syncretism between the Hindu past and the Islamic present of the Valley. A paper published by the European Foundation of South Asian Studies states, “His [Nund Rishi’s] teachings of equality and tolerance are revered equally by Hindus and Muslims. As a result of the Rishi tradition, Kashmiris reputedly practiced a form of tolerance and inclusivity called ‘Kashmiriness’; a notion which implied the respect for each other’s religious traditions and religious festivals. As later explained in this paper, this famous practice was re-named later ‘Kashmiriyat’, a term that owes its roots to Persian and Arabic.”
This pluralism continued with only one historical abatement (a communal riot that took place in the late 13th century) until Pakistan, which had projected itself as ‘protector of Muslims against Hindu tyranny’ began to infiltrate Islamic zealots inculcated in fanatical practices to Islamicize Kashmir. In doing so, Pakistan has long played a contentious and deeply disruptive role in the geopolitical relationship between India and Pakistan. While diplomatic dialogues, trade efforts, and people-to-people exchanges have occasionally softened bilateral tensions, the persistent use—or at the very least, tacit tolerance—of cross-border terrorism by elements within the Pakistani state apparatus has entrenched terrorism as an intractable feature of Islamabad’s foreign policy toward New Delhi. This enduring pattern has both historical roots and strategic calculations, which continue to undermine peace efforts and entrench hostilities between the nuclear-armed neighbors.
PAKISTAN ADOPTS TERRORISM AS INSTRUMENT OF STATE POLICY AFTER HUMILATING DEFEAT BY INDIA IN 1971
The theory behind the formation of Pakistan was essentially broken by the genocidal oppression of Bengali speaking East Pakistanis in 1970 after the Awami League had won a majority in Pakistan’s first elections, which had been authorized by Pakistan’s military dictator, President and Commander-in-chief of Pakistan’s Armed forces, Yahya Khan. It led to the killing of upwards of three million East Pakistanis, most of them Hindus, and the rape of around 400,000 women, authorized at the highest levels and utilized by the Pakistan army a weapon of ethnic cleansing.
The subsequent liberation of East Pakistan by rebels called the Mukta Bahini in conjunction with the Indian Armed Forces, led to the creation of a country centred on language rather than religion: Bangladesh. Interestingly, India while India was dealing with a refugee crisis when approximately 10 million refugees fleeing the genocide streamed across the Eastern border, it still did not attack Pakistan. Rather, it was Pakistan that started the war by launching what it called a ‘pre-emptive strike’ across India’s Western flank – once again in an attempt to take Indian territory in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir. India responded decisively, and less than two weeks, Pakistan surrendered with approximately 93,000 Pakistani soldiers taken as prisoners of war.
It was the most humiliating of three defeats in wars started by Pakistan against India, cementing the notion that it was impossible for Pakistan to defeat India in a conventional war. So, Pakistan began went back to its former tactic of training, indoctrinating, and arming Islamic militants and sending them into Indian territory to attack both civilian and military targets.
This evolved into a strategy called, “death by a thousand cuts,” in which the damage done to India of each individual attack was miniscule – but taken as a whole, would bring India to the negotiation table over the issue of Jammu & Kashmir.
The recalibration of Pakistani strategic defence doctrine to leverage what it called “asymmetric warfare” as a counterweight to India’s recognized conventional military superiority led to the establishment by Pakistan’s intelligence agency and military to promote an extreme form of Islam among illiterate people, and recruit from them to create an irregular terrorist armed force.
When asked about arming and abetting militants, the Defence Minister of Pakistan, while admitting this was a longstanding policy during a recent interview with Yalda Hakim, a former BBC correspondent and presenter for Sky News in the UK, said that the West was to blame because Pakistan had engaged with such elements so they could be used as tools against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the Cold War. However, by the time this Mujahedeen force as they were called was ready to be called into action, they were already fully formed and trained at by the Pakistan military to be used against India, which is why they could be so quickly deployed into Afghanistan.
Hakim has also said that despite the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto Zardari, her son Bilawal Zardari (who goes by Bhutto in contravention of Islamic Law by which he should use his father’s surname to emphasis his dynastic claim to power being the maternal grandson former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) admitted to her that Pakistan has a long history of entanglement with terrorism: “I don’t think it’s a secret that Pakistan has a past as far as extremist groups are concerned.”
Hence, Pakistan is well known for – and now openly admits to – using terrorist proxies, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir that has emerged as the fulcrum of Pakistan’s strategic calculus. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Pakistani intelligence services, notably the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), were deeply involved in training, arming, and directing Islamist militants to wage a low-intensity conflict on Indian territory.
Such groups as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) (or Army of the Prophet), have since been implicated in some of the most devastating attacks on Indian soil, including the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The recent attack in Pahalgam Kashmir, targeting Hindu men and carried out to inflict maximum trauma upon family members, was carried out by a group that is an offshoot of the LeT.
STATE COMPLICITY AND DENIAL
Pakistan’s civilian leadership has often sought to distance itself from terrorist activities, disavowing state involvement and claiming lack of control over non-state actors. Government officials even go so far as to say that Pakistan is a victim of terrorism. This refers to the Frankenstein’s monster that the ISI created, blowing back on them when Western pressure requires Pakistan to round up a few usual suspects. Even former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, once a strong supporter of Pakistan, dating back to the days of Benazir Bhutto through to Nawaz Sharif has stated as much: “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours. You know, eventually those snakes are going to turn on whoever has them in the backyard.” This phenomenon – the slipping from vicelike control – of extremists from the ISI is what Pakistani officials are referencing when they cry about being “victims of terror.”
The distinction between state and non-state actors in Pakistan’s strategic landscape remains blurred. International observers and Indian officials frequently point to the ISI’s historical links with jihadist groups, suggesting not only complicity but calculated patronage rooted in Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives.
This ambiguity allows Pakistan plausible deniability while perpetuating a state of “managed instability” in the region. The strategic benefit lies in keeping India militarily and diplomatically preoccupied, particularly in Kashmir, without provoking an all-out war that would have devastating consequences for both nations.
DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE AND THE LIMITS OF ENGAGEMENT
Terrorism as a foreign policy tool has effectively paralyzed meaningful diplomatic engagement between India and Pakistan. Every attempt at rapprochement—be it through Track II diplomacy or formal bilateral talks—has been sabotaged by major terrorist attacks. The 1999 Lahore Declaration was quickly overshadowed by the Kargil conflict; the Agra Summit in 2001 was followed by the Parliament attack; and the goodwill generated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore in 2015 was erased by the 2016 Pathankot attack.
India has, out of frustration, has responded with military action, exemplified by the surgical strikes of 2016 and the Balakot air strikes in 2019 following the Pulwama attack. However, these responses, while popular domestically, have not altered the underlying dynamics of Pakistan’s strategic behavior.
INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS AND STRATEGIC ISOLATION
Globally, Pakistan has faced increasing scrutiny and pressure due to its harboring of terrorist elements. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) placed Pakistan on its grey list, demanding more stringent action against terror financing. Yet, the geopolitical environment, especially Pakistan’s strategic utility to powers like China and the United States (particularly during the Afghanistan conflict), has provided Islamabad with enough diplomatic maneuverability to avoid significant sanctions.
Indeed, the prior Trump administration in 2018 halted the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan on the basis that the military was playing a “double game” in Afghanistan: on the one hand appearing to aid in the US fight against the Taliban alongside aiding and abetting the very same extremist group.
Without Pakistani assistance, there is no way that the Taliban could not only defeat the fickle and divided Afghan National Army but also plow through the Panjshir valley, which had never before been taken by either the Soviets or the Taliban.
Since the Taliban were born in Pakistan and raised by the ISI, the Pakistani government have treated them like their stooges. This derisive attitude towards an extremist group, which is now a a full fledged regime, has cause hostility over the Durand Line, the border between Pakistan’s lawless Federally Administered (meaning undemocratically controlled) Tribal Areas and Afghanistan.
The Pahalgam attack demonstrated that Pakistan, again, was trying to distract from its own internal problems by killing innocent civilians on Indian soil.
A STRATEGIC STALEMATE WHICH INDIA IS TRYING TO TURN WITH FOREIGN DELEGATIONS
Terrorism remains an entrenched and seemingly intractable element of Pakistan’s foreign policy toward India. It reflects a complex interplay of historical grievances, military asymmetry, ideological narratives, and strategic calculation. As long as Pakistan continues to perceive proxy warfare as a viable means of offsetting Indian dominance, and as long as it maintains a compartmentalized policy toward different militant groups, the prospect for lasting peace in South Asia remains elusive.
Having long avoided a policy of bringing international attention to the issue due to the bitter experience of Nehru’s strategic blunder of internationalizing the Kashmir dispute and failing miserably with the UN, India has decided to shift gears by sending delegations to explain the recent military response to the Pahalgam attack, and telling the story of Pakistan’s continued waging of a terror proxy war against India.
India’s position is that the stakes have never been higher, for every terror attack Pakistan foments, a decisive military response, which could mean as India did in Operation Sindoor, striking deep into the heartland of Pakistan, destroying Pakistan’s airpower, blocking off key ports or even disabling key ports such as Karachi. Such responses may well raise the spectre of nuclear conflict if Pakistan finds itself in a situation in which it feels its existence as a country is threatened. So, India is banking on the world applying pressure on Pakistan to stop its support of terrorism.
The World could respond by putting Pakistan on the list of states supporting terrorism or levying trade sanctions against the already economically beleaguered nation. The global community could threaten to cut off IMF funding of which Pakistan just received approximately $2 billion. And, as a carrot, the world could say that they will help develop the country, which remains a backward state.
Unfortunately, if Pakistani politicians believe that Trump White House will be ambivalent and the country and military will continue to receive Chinese backing, there will be no end to terror. It is a policy woven in the fabric of the country, and it will take a paradigm shift to root it out. Consequently, the Indian diplomatic delegations have a steep hill to climb to make the region and the world a safer place.